

Anaphoricity and Accommodation: A Comparison of *Too* in English and *-to* in Korean

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ABSTRACT

The Journal of Studies in Language 35.1, 109-120. Previous studies of *-to* in Korean have assumed a certain degree of parallelism between the Korean particle and *too* in English. This paper presents a set of cases involving *-to* in Korean, which stands in clear contrast with the usage of *too* in English. Following Kripke's observation that *too* in English requires an antecedent in active contexts, Geurts and van der Sandt and others treat it as an anaphoric presupposition trigger and relate the anaphoricity of the particle with its inability to accommodate its presupposition. In this paper, it is shown that *-to* in Korean cannot be handled by an anaphoric approach because it can either have antecedents in non-active contexts, or no antecedent at all. This paper proposes a non-anaphoric analysis of *-to* in Korean, and it is argued that the lack of anaphoricity of *-to* allows it to accommodate its presupposition easily, unlike *too* in English. (Hansung University)

Keywords: focus particle, presupposition, accommodation, anaphor, conventional implicature

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본인이 투고한 논문은 다른 학술지에 게재된 적이 없으며 타인의 논문을 표절하지 않았음을 서약합니다. 추후 중복게재 혹은 표절된 것으로 밝혀질 시에는 논문게재 취소와 일정 기간 논문게출의 제한 조치를 받게 됨을 인지하고 있습니다.

1. Introduction

Too in English and *-to* in Korean belong to different syntactic and morphological categories: the former is an adverb, and the latter, a clitic. They are, however, comparable in that they carry additivity as the main part of their meanings. This is why König (1991) treats them on a par under the notion of “focus particle,” whose role is to partition the material within its scope into focus and non-focus. While both *too* and *-to* can thus be deemed as additive focus particles, they behave in distinct ways.

It is widely accepted that *too* is a presupposition trigger, even though there are disagreements about the exact content of the presupposition. According to König, for instance, in the connected speech consisting of (1a) and (1b), the subject *Sam* of (1b) is associated with *too* through focusing and is stressed accordingly.

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- (1) a. Lou went to the party.
 b. Sam went to the party, too.
 c. Sam went to the party.
 d. Somebody other than Sam went to the party.

Assuming that the entire sentence of (1b) is the scope of the particle, the predicate *went to the party* becomes non-focus. Here, ‘Sam’ is called the focus value, and focusing invokes alternatives to it. ‘Lou’ is one such alternative, which is actually explicitly mentioned in the context and stands in contrast with the focus value. In this framework, the locus of the focus bears directly on the semantic interpretation of the sentence containing the particle. Hence, in the context of (1a), the speaker of the sentence (1b) asserts (1c) and presupposes (1d).

An interesting peculiarity about the presupposition of *too* was observed by Kripke (2009)¹⁾, according to whom the satisfaction of the presupposition of *too* requires its antecedent to be in an active context. In other words, *too* is anaphoric. He illustrates this point with the infelicity of *too* in the following sentence uttered out of the blue.

- (2) Tonight Sam is having supper in New York, too.

He points out that *too* is not acceptable in (2) as a conversation starter, even when there are actually other people having supper in New York at the point of utterance.

The Korean particle *-to* seems to behave differently from *too* in English in this regard. Let us consider the following dialogue from the movie *When Spring Comes*, where Speaker B is conversing with his mother, Speaker A. *Yenhi* in the first sentence is Speaker B’s ex-girlfriend.

- (3) A: yenhi-to a-ni wuli isa ka-nun ke
 Yenhi-TO know-Int we moving go-Rel thing
 ‘Does Yenhi know that we are moving out?’
 B: emma, emma-n isa ka-nikka coh-a?
 mom mom-Top moving go-now.that good-Int
 ‘Mom, are you happy now that we are moving?’
 A: cohchi kulem emma-to aphathu hanpen sala po-ca
 good so mom-TO apartment once live try-Coh
 ‘Of course, I’m happy. I get to live in an apartment now.’

Speaker A’s first sentence begins the dialogue, and yet, the occurrence of *-to* in *yenhitto* is fully acceptable. The occurrence of *-to* in *emmato* of her third sentence is in stark contrast to that of *too* in (2). The sentence is fine even though the context does not provide a specific person who lives in an apartment. These uses of *-to* call for a different approach to the particle than previously taken.

In this paper, we propose a non-anaphoric analysis of the Korean particle which is distinct from that of *too* in English,

1) This is a published version of Kripke’s manuscript from 1990.

so that its peculiar behavior can be explained in terms of accommodation. In Section 2, we give Kripke's thesis more details by comparing it with Chafe's psychological taxonomy of discourse concepts. We also discuss the issue of the difficulty to accommodate the presupposition triggered by *too*. In Section 3, we propose an analysis of *-to* which can account for the problem cases. Section 4 concludes the paper.

2. *Too* in English

2.1 Anaphoricity and Active Contexts

In this section, we delve into Kripke's notion of "active contexts." Since the notion is not defined precisely by Kripke, we bring up related notions introduced by Chafe and Prince concerning cognitive status of discourse entities. Kripke's original observation that *too* requires its antecedent in an active context suggests that it is anaphoric. Kripke's notion of "active" is comparable to that of "given" discussed by Chafe, who states that pronominalization applies "only to items that convey given information" (Chafe, 1974: 31). The two notions, however, are distinguishable. For Kripke, the antecedent of *too* is in an active context if it is explicitly mentioned in the previous text, or is being actively engaged in the minds of the discourse participants. On the other hand, Chafe's "given" information is what "the speaker assumes to be in the consciousness of the addressee at the time of the utterance." This means Kripke's "active" is a narrower notion than Chafe's "given."

To better understand what specifically counts as Kripke's active contexts, let us review Chafe's (1987) study on grammatically relevant psychological status of discourse entities. He introduces three-way distinctions based on the degree to which discourse participants are conscious of concepts at hand: "active," "semi-active," and "inactive." Concepts, comprising objects, events, and properties, are active when they are "in a person's focus of consciousness" (Chafe, 1987: 25). They are inactive when "they are in a person's long-term memory" (*ibid.*). The intermediate category, "semi-active," actually consists of two different kinds of cognitive status. To put them in Dryer (1996)'s terminology, one is "semi-deactivated" and the other is "accessible." An active concept automatically turns semi-deactivated if it is not mentioned by any of the interlocutors for some time. Since Chafe's notions are rooted in cognition, the status of a concept may change like this along the progression of a discourse. Accessible concepts are those which an interlocutor may infer through association with a frame or schema linked to an active concept. Hence, we have four different kinds of psychological status to consider: inactive, accessible, semi-deactivated, and active. Let us see whether discourse entities of each kind can serve as the antecedent of *too*.

It is safe to conclude that an inactive discourse entity, which has yet to be introduced to the discourse, cannot be the antecedent of *too*. How about an accessible entity? Can it be an antecedent of *too*? In (4a), *the driver* is a definite description which represents an accessible entity (Prince, 1981: 233).

- (4) a. I got on a bus yesterday and the driver was drunk.
 b. #I got on a bus, and I was wearing sunglasses, too.

Infelicity of (4b) suggests that an accessible entity is not a good candidate for the antecedent of *too*.

Let us turn now to semi-deactivated entities. Suppose a discourse has a mention of individual A. After a few sentences subsequently alluding to other individuals B and C, will one of the interlocutors be able to use *too* expecting the other will understand that the antecedent of the particle is A? It is unlikely that it will work. That is, Chafe's "semi-active" entities are not suitable to be alternatives showing contrast to the focus value of *too*.

This leaves us with active entities as candidates for the antecedent of *too*. Active concepts come in two flavors. They correspond roughly to Prince's (1981) two subcategories of "evoked": "textually evoked" and "situationally evoked."²) Entities are textually evoked through explicit mention. It is easy to see that concepts belonging to this subcategory is optimal for being the antecedent of *too*, as was illustrated by (1). However, it turns out that situationally evoked concepts, which include discourse participants, are not equally suitable for the role. Consider the following dialogue from the novel *Iysh*, where Speaker A and Speaker B are being transported on a cattle truck along with other Jews.

- (5) A: Do you know where they are taking us?
B: I don't know.

The situation is such that Speaker B may well assume that Speaker A does not know the answer to the question. Note, however, that Speaker B's answer does not contain *either*. *I don't know* is pretty much the default response in such a dialogue.

The longer form *I don't know, either* is typically expected when one of the discourse participants is textually evoked, as in the following quote from the movie *Taxi Driver*.

- (6) A: I'm not Bertrand Russell. Well what do ya want. I'm a cabbie you know. What do I know? I mean, I don't even know what the fuck you're talkin' about.
B: Yeah, I don't know. Maybe I don't know, either.

The use of *either* is natural when it is explicitly mentioned that the other person does not know the matter in question in the immediate context. This suggests that situational evocation alone does not necessarily render a discourse participant a viable antecedent for *too* (or *either*).

To summarize, Kripke's proposal that *too* requires its antecedent in an active context can be elucidated by casting it in Chafe's taxonomy of discourse concepts in terms of their cognitive status. Out of the three categories, i.e., active, semi-active, and inactive concepts, those which are active and, more specifically, textually evoked are the most suitable to be bound to the anaphor *too*.

2.2 Inability to Accommodate

The peculiarity of *too* as an anaphor has been claimed to be closely related to another of its unique traits, its inability to accommodate. What is accommodation? Lewis formulates the rule of accommodation for presupposition in the

2) The parallelism here between Prince's and Chafe's taxonomies does not mean that they share the same theoretical basis. Unlike Chafe's, Prince's notions are rooted in knowledge, that is, how interlocutors are familiar with discourse entities to varying degrees.

following fashion (Lewis, 1979: 340).

- (7) If at time t something is said that requires presupposition P to be acceptable, and if P is not presupposed just before t , then—*ceteris paribus* and within certain limits—presupposition P comes into existence at t .

Thus, when spoken out of the blue, the following sentence can be acceptable, even if the addressee had no idea about the monarchy of Sweden prior to its utterance.

- (8) The King of Sweden is charming and classy.

The analysis of (8) goes like this: the presupposition carried by the definite description *the King of Sweden*, i.e., ‘Sweden has a king,’ can be accommodated at the time it is uttered.³⁾

Accommodation is a repair strategy, coming to the rescue of a presupposition not satisfied by the context. However, it is not available with the same ease for every presupposition trigger. According to Beaver and Zeevat (2007), some presupposition triggers simply cannot accommodate, among which are *another*, *indeed*, and *too*.

- (9) a. Another one bit the dust.
 b. The future is here indeed.
 c. Americans should be protesting, too.

Uttered out of the blue, the sentences in (9) are infelicitous, and accommodation cannot save them.

Geurts and van der Sandt (2004) offer an explanation of the peculiarity of *too*. Taking up Kripke’s insight that *too* is anaphoric, Geurts and van der Sandt (2004) contend that *too* has pronominal element in it. This pronoun-like quality, they explain, is responsible for the particle’s inability to have its presupposition accommodated. They suggest that accommodation requires sufficient descriptive content, like the definite phrase *the King of Sweden* in (8), and that *too* is deficient in content, like pronouns.

To summarize, Kripke characterizes *too* as anaphoric, and van der Sandt and Geurts put the particle in the same category as pronouns. They ascribe its inability to accommodate to its lack of semantic content, a common property shared by other pronouns.

3. *-To* in Korean

3.1 Previous Research on *-To*

Previous studies of the main usage of *-to* in Korean converge on defining it as an incremental element, adding a value to the existing set of values of the same kind. This treatment is compatible with the characterization of the particle as an

3) For a detailed discussion of the Stalnakerian view of the phenomenon, see Simons (2003).

additive focus particle. There are, however, other uses of the particle illustrated by the following.

- (10) a. ku mwuncey-nun sensayngnim-to mos phwu-n-ta
 that problem-Top teacher-TO cannot solve-Imp-Dec
 ‘Even the teacher can’t solve the problem.’
 b. nu-n kekceng-to manh-ta
 you-Top worry-TO much-Dec
 ‘You worry too much.’
 c. ton-to myengye-to ta pwucilep-ta
 money-TO fame-TO all useless-Dec
 ‘Fortune and fame are all futile.’

(10a) illustrates the scalar use, (10b) the emphatic use, and (10c) the reciprocal use. In the present paper, the discussion is limited to the use of *-to* as an additive particle, and the issue of how to analyze these other uses is set aside for future research.

Lee (2004) deserves a special mention since she incorporates the notion of anaphoricity in analyzing *-to*. Lee incorporates the rule (11a) for interpreting *too* (Heim, 1992: 189) into her own analysis as in (11b) (Lee, 2004: 129).

- (11) a. $\phi[\alpha F]_{\text{too}_i}$ presupposes $x_i \neq \alpha$ & $\phi[x_i]$
 b. $\llbracket \text{to} \rrbracket = \lambda x e. \lambda y e. \lambda P \langle e, t \rangle: x \neq y \ \& \ P(x)=1. P(y)=1^4$

In (11a), anaphoricity of *too* is captured by the co-indexation of the particle and its antecedent in the context. In (11b), x is the pronoun, and y is the focus value. What is important for our discussion is that (11b) is unsuitable for a case like (3). However, examples like (3) are not hard to encounter; they are not what any serious investigation into the meaning of *-to* can put aside as marginal.

On the other hand, there have been approaches to *-to* which regard it as having a different kind of information status. Kim (1999) claims that *-to* does not trigger a presupposition, and that its meaning should be treated as conventional implicature. He puts the meaning of *-to* in (12a) as (12b), where x and y are variables for entities and P for functions (Kim 1999: 88-89).

- (12) a. phil-i wa-ss-ta con-to wa-ss-ta
 Phil-Nom come-Past-Dec John-too come-Past-Dec
 ‘Phil came. John came, too.’
 b. $\lambda y \lambda P[\exists x [P(y) \ \& \ P(x)]]$

Kim treats (12b) as conventional implicature, not presupposition. He finds support for his claim in three properties of (12b): non-defeasibility, detachability, and non-calculability. However, these properties hold not only for conventional

4) This is a lexical entry of *-to* when it is associated with an individual as its focus value.

implicatures, but also for presuppositions. As pointed out by Potts (2005), one crucial divide between a conventional implicature and a presupposition is that the former usually does not convey information belonging to the common ground, but that the latter does. By this criterion, analyzing the meaning of *-to* in terms of presupposition is more apt because in (12), backgrounded information is picked up by *-to*.

Kim (2016) has a similar approach to *-to* in that he treats its meaning as conventional implicature. He argues that examples like (13) lend support to his approach (Kim 2016: 152).

- (13) minswu-to phathi-ey ka-ss-ul kanungseng-i iss-e
 Minsoo-too party-loc go-Past-Rel possibility-Nom exist-Dec
 kulentey eccemyen minswu honca ka-ss-ulci-to mol-la
 but maybe Minsoo alone go-Past-whether-too not.know-Dec
 ‘It is possible that Minsoo went to the party too, but maybe Minsoo went there alone.’

In (13), the second clause is there to deny, not the main assertion of the first clause, but the meaning conveyed by *-to*. Notwithstanding the awkwardness of (13) itself,⁵⁾ such cancellation of the information carried by *-to* should lead one to treating it as something other than either conventional implicature or presupposition. As Kim acknowledges, neither conventional implicature nor presupposition is cancellable according to Potts.⁶⁾

Based on the review of previous research, we will maintain the characterization of *-to* as an additive focus particle responsible for a presupposition. In Section 3.2, we look into its behavior by examining how the context licenses its uses. Since it is crucial for us to be able to identify the cognitive status of entities appearing in the context, we will base our discussion mostly on movie dialogues which come in concrete contexts.

3.2 Non-Anaphoric *-to*

Let us go back to the problem case in (3).

- (3) A: yenhi-to a-ni wuli isa ka-nun ke
 Yenhi-TO know-Int we moving go-Rel thing
 ‘Does Yenhi know that we are moving out?’
 B: emma, emma-n isa ka-nikka coh-a?
 mom mom-Top moving go-now.that good-Int
 ‘Mom, are you happy now that we are moving?’

5) The sentence itself sounds fairly awkward, which stems from the failure for the second clause to deny such non-assertive information of the first clause.

6) There is another kind of meaning not dealt with here, namely, explicature, in discussing the information status of the meaning of *-to*. Sperber and Wilson (1986) take explicature to be a kind of assumption which needs to be spelled out in order to arrive at the full proposition the speaker intends to convey through a sentence. As such, explicature is recovered through contextual inferring, and hence is cancellable according to Carston (2002). Since the meaning carried by *-to* is not cancellable, we can say that it is not explicature.

A: cohchi kulem emma-to aphathu hanpen sala po-ca
 good so mom-TO apartment once live try-Coh
 ‘Of course, I’m happy. I get to live in an apartment now.’

Here, there are two occurrences of *-to*, and both of them showcase how it is different from *too*. First, consider the occurrence of *-to* in Speaker A’s second line. Here, an alternative value to ‘mother’ is not detected either through an explicit mention of it or its salience in the mind of the interlocutors. Using Chafe’s terminology, there is no active concept which can serve as the antecedent of *-to*. It is obviously true that there are many people in Korea who live in an apartment, and that there is a tendency of older people preferring apartments to houses. They may well be part of the discourse participants’ shared knowledge. However, they are trivial facts and are not likely to be active at the time of utterance of the sentence in question. They are not semi-active, either, since they haven’t been mentioned at all before, and since they are not part of any frame or schema brought about by an active concept which Speaker B can infer from. We may safely conclude that the antecedent of *-to*, if it can be called “antecedent” at all, is inactive.

Secondly, note the use of *-to* in the first remark by Speaker A. Given that this remark begins the entire discourse, there is no explicit context which contains a salient alternative to ‘Yenhi,’ the focus value of *-to*. Of course, one can take into account the obvious, and trivial, fact that both the speaker and the addressee know that they are moving, and argue that this fact justifies the use of the *-to*. However, this background knowledge does not seem salient enough to constitute an active context *à la* Kripke. Note that in the same situation the English counterpart of the sentence is not likely to contain *also* or *too*.

Let us compare this use of *-to* with that of *too* discussed earlier. Consider the following quote from the book *Hidden Card*.

- (14) A: yepo celen aphathu-ey-n etten salam-i sa-l-kka?
 Honey like.that apartment-Loc-Top what.kind person-Nom live-will-int
 ‘Honey, what sort of people do you think live in an apartment like that?’
 B: na-to molla kulechiman pwulep-ta
 I-TO not.know but envious-Dec
 ‘I don’t know, but I envy them.’

This example stands in clear contrast with (5) in Section 2. Here, the husband asks the wife a question to which he apparently does not know the answer, and to this she responds with a sentence containing *-to*. In such a setting, *nato molla* is typically chosen over other forms with the subject followed by *-nun* or no particle, e.g., *Nanun molla* or *Na molla*. The default choices of *Nato molla* in Korean and *I don’t know* in English in similar situations certainly need explaining. In both (14) and (5), the interlocutors themselves are active concepts. While *too* in English only allows textually evoked, not situationally evoked, concepts to be its antecedent, *-to* in Korean can have all active concepts as its antecedent.

If we were to maintain that *-to* is anaphoric, then the first occurrence of *-to* in (3) should be bound to a situationally invoked entities, and the second *-to* to an inactive entity. However, that would make *-to* a peculiar kind of anaphor, and

clearly, this is not what we expect from the behavior of *too* in English. This is not the only way the two particles are licensed differently. Sometimes, it is doubtful that any alternative to the focus value of the particle is even identifiable.

The following quote from the movie *Sisily 2km* follows a situation where Speaker A previously have noticed Speaker B getting up in the middle of the night and leaving the house for a while many times.

- (15) A: a kuntay saypyek-ey-n eti-l chwulhaha-si-ess-supnikka?
 Ah by.the.way early.morning-at-Top where-Acc go.out-Hon-Past-Int
 haywuso ka-si-nun kes-to ani-si-ntus siph-ess-ko mal-ipnita
 toilet go-Hon-Rel thing-TO not-Hon-like seem-Perf-and saying-Dec
 ‘By the way, where did you go so early in the morning? You didn’t look like you were going to the toilet.’
 B: nwu-ka? nay nay-ka?
 who-Nom I I-Nom
 ‘Who? Me?’

It not obvious from the context what other specific reasons Speaker A may have in mind for Speaker B’s odd behavior. Note that ‘going to the toilet too’ is within the scope of negation. If we are to apply a classical treatment of *too* to the use of *-to* here, we will have to be able to find a specific alternative to ‘going to the toilet’, that is, another reason which speaker A can exclude from his conjecture as to what made Speaker B get up from his bed in the night.

The following are more examples from *Sejong Corpus* illustrating the case of unidentifiable alternatives to the focus value of *-to*.

- (16) yenpyen chenye-wa kyelhonha-kiwuihayse-n ton-to kkway
 Yanbian maiden-with marry-in.order.to-Top money-TO quite
 tu-n-ta-ko ha-te-ntey elma-na tul-ess-ciyo?
 cost-Imp-Dec-Quot say-ret-and how.much-as.much.as cost-Past-Int
 ‘I heard that it takes a lot of money to get married to a Yanbian woman. How much did it cost?’
- (17) ca, sihem-to kkuthna-ss-ko hay-ss-unikka onul-un e hana-uy cwucey-lul kac-ko
 well exam-TO end-Past-and do-Past-since today-Top uh one-of subject-Acc take-and
 onul ssu-ko palphyoha-nun sikan-ul kac-keyss-eyo al-keyss-ci
 today write-and present-Rel time-Acc have-Prsm-Dec know-Prsm-Int
 ‘Well, now that the exam is over and all, today we will have a session of writing on one subject and presenting it. Okay?’

In (16), an interview with a farmer whose newly wed wife from Yanbian—a Korean autonomous region in China—recently disappeared, the speaker asks how much the marriage cost. The particle *-to* attached to *ton* ‘money’ implies that there are other things the marriage may have cost, but there is no reference, direct or indirect, to them. (17) is an announcement from a teacher to the students in his class, where she mentions the recent exam as the background against

which the class will start new activities. The presence of *-to* again implies that other things could be in the back of the mind of the teacher, but there is no clue to what they might be. Not only are the relevant alternatives to the focus value unclear in all the examples above, it does not seem to matter at all whether they are shared by the discourse participants or not. Unlike the cases of (3) and (14), here we can't even fathom what could possibly be the alternative values the speaker has in mind.

Conventionally, anaphora relies on the notion of co-indexation. An anaphoric expression requires an antecedent whose index is the same as its index. From the examples surveyed so far, where the referent of the antecedent of the particle was more or less hard to identify, we can conclude that *-to* is not anaphoric. This sets the Korean particle apart from *too* in English. The Korean particle, unlike *too*, does not require the alternative to its focus value to be available in active contexts.

The discussion so far suggests that the presupposition of *-to* can be represented in the following fashion, where x and y are variables for individuals and P a variable for a predicate.

$$(18) \lambda x. \lambda P. \exists y (y \neq x \ \& \ P(y))$$

Note that unlike (11b), (18), as an existential presupposition, does not contain a variable for a pronominal element. For instance, a sentence containing non-anaphoric *-to* as in (19a) can be said to presuppose (19b).

- (19) a. K-to canchi-ey ka-ss-eyo.
 K-TO party-Loc go-Past-Dec
 'K went to the party, too.'
 b. Someone other than K went to the party.

Since *-to* is not anaphoric, its presupposition can be accommodated easily unlike that of *too*. For example, in (20), a quote from the movie *Singles*,

- (20) A: onulpam-ey han-can ettay-yo? li tongmi-ssi-lul wihay thukpyelhi saywetwu-n phulayn-to iss-ko
 tonight-Loc one-glass how-Int Lee.Dongmi-Miss-Acc for specially make-rel plan-TO have-and
 'How about a few drinks tonight? I have special plans for you.'
 B: ce-to phulayn-i iss-nuntey
 I-TO plan-Nom have-so
 'I have plans, too, you know.'

Speaker B's sentence presupposes that someone other than Speaker B has plans, which is satisfied by the context. However, the second sentence uttered by Speaker A presupposes he has some other reason than having a special plan for Speaker B, for inviting her to go to a bar after work. This latter presupposition is accommodated, not being part of the active context. Such accommodation accounts for all of the examples cited above.

4. Conclusion

In this paper, we presented certain uses of *-to* which are problematic to an anaphoric approach to the particle. These uses reveal a clear difference between the behavior of *-to* and *too*. Basically, *too* is regarded as anaphoric for two grounds: it requires an antecedent in an active context, *à la* Kripke, and it does not accommodate its presupposition like most other presupposition triggers. However, in an analysis of *-to* in Korean, there is no room for an anaphoric component as was proposed for *too* by Heim and Geurts and van der Sandt. To account for the problematic cases, we proposed an existential presupposition for the Korean particle, and claimed that it can accommodate its presupposition easily, since it is not anaphoric.

The scope of the current paper is quite limited, considering a wide variety of *-to*'s usage as was briefly mentioned in Section 3.1. It would be challenging but worthwhile to expand the current study to future research on accounting for these diverse uses of *-to*. This expansive study will have to deal with the issue of ambiguity of the particle, as well as that of identifying the exact semantic content of the particle commonly found in all the seemingly disparate uses.

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